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At the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1951, when Sherman Kent was
discussing whether the Soviet Union would attack Yugoslavia, he suggested
that intelligence estimates such as "serious possibility" be converted to
numbers, such as “65 to 35 odds in favor of an attack.” No one took his advice.
Now the numbers are back. Superforecasting reports on a multi-year study
sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
In the study, an army of forecasters attracted from all sectors of U.S. society
were given hundreds of very specific questions such as whether North Korea
would set off a nuclear explosion between January 1 to September 1, 2014.
Eventually, a group of the best forecasters was isolated and compared to
parallel teams in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Result: they outperformed the IC, and by a significant margin (although the exact number
remains classified). The question is why and how, and that is what
Superforecasting explains.
There are numerous examples of important pundits who have very poor
forecasting records, but are listened to anyway because no one goes back and
evaluates their performance. “To learn from failure, we must know when we
fail” (181). Comparing forecasters is done with Brier scores, which were taken
from a 1950 article in Monthly Weather Review that examined how well
weathermen can tell if it will rain. Superforecasters have the lowest (best)
Brier scores, and this is an important point in the book: to improve
forecasting, one needs to keep track of how accurate forecasts have been, and
learn what works and what doesn't.
None of the superforecasters identified have any intelligence background, yet
they routinely out-perform professionals in the IC. What are they like?
Superforecasters score better than about 80% of the population on
intelligence and knowledge tests. They are smarter, but “most fall well short
of so-called genius territory” (109). They tend to break problems into
components and make estimates for each part then put them together to get
an overall estimate. They tend to start with an anchor estimate (base rate),
then make incremental (granular) adjustments as new data arrives, rather
than overreacting to new information. They tend to synthesize other views
with their own, and keep re-thinking and scrutinizing their own assumptions.
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They avoid getting stuck on any particular idea or agenda. They have “little
ego invested in each forecast” (163). There is an interesting anecdote about an
expert in armaments who was a great forecaster for everything except
questions on arms.
They tend to be probabilistic and nondeterministic thinkers, e.g., they do not
believe in “meant to be,” and do not believe anything necessarily has to
happen. Nothing is ever really “certain” and things are considered much
more complex than they at first appear. They consider not the “why” but the
“how,” and easily work in numbers. Typically, they are intellectually curious
persons who enjoy mental challenges.
Putting superforecasters into teams was a challenge, but turned out to be
successful–teams were 23% more accurate than individuals, and 30% more
accurate than prediction markets such as Inkling and Lumenogic. “If
forecasters can keep questioning themselves and their teammates, and
welcome vigorous debate, the group can become more than the sum of its
parts” (198). People learned to offer thanks for constructive criticism.
Superforecasters who were joined into teams became 50% more accurate.
Teams need to be diverse. The researchers worked out an “extremizing
algorithm” that would cause even regular forecaster teams enough of a boost
to outperform some superforecaster teams.
The book’s strength is its clarity of presentation, and numerous examples to
introduce its insights. It has an appendix entitled “Ten Commandments for
Aspiring Superforecasters” that contains advice such as “Break seemingly
intractable problems into tractable sub-problems,” which is what the authors
call “Fermi-izing,” named after the physicist Enrico Fermi (1901-1954). But
the appendix only makes sense after the reader has studied the book. The
notes are extensive and have key references to key journal articles that allow
the reader to look more deeply into various issues. In the end, however, there
is a feeling of wanting more insight on exactly how superforecasters do their
work, and more about how the IARPA project was operated. Nevertheless,
merely reading the book will change one’s perspective and behavior.
Superforecasters is very much worth reading by intelligence professionals, or
by anyone in any field who is interested in understanding how to look into the
future. It should be required reading for all students interested in
intelligence, and for professors who teach intelligence – they should update
their courses to reflect these new insights.
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